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Introduction
Developments in New Zealand media law have apparently accelerated even
more in the last year and a half. In defamation, the New Zealand courts remain
unsure whether hyperlinking to a defamatory article can amount to publishing
that article. However, it seems active administration of a webpage focused on
particular issues can amount to publication of what is said about those issues,
whether by the administrator or third parties. Helpfully, the Court of Appeal
has made it very clear that a publisher of third party online comments cannot
be liable for those comments unless there is actual knowledge of the existence
of the comments and there has been reasonable time to remove them. Further
decisions from the High Court indicate a willingness to develop a public
interest defence, although no successful cases have arisen on the facts as yet.
Furthermore, it appears it may be more difficult to establish there is a public
interest defence for comments made on online single issue discussion forums.
In breach of confidence, a prominent blogger obtained an interim injunction
to prevent disclosure of thousands of his emails and other online discussion by
a hacker, but was unable to prevent the media from using information already
leaked. A government body obtained a permanent injunction preventing a man
from disclosing a spreadsheet of material related to thousands of
earthquake-damaged Christchurch properties. When the man defied the
injunction, he was fined for contempt. Maori television faced difficulties
establishing a public interest defence in a proposed programme in interim
injunction proceedings but the action was dropped and media ultimately
obtained access to affidavit evidence produced for the proceedings.
In privacy, a further case confirmed that it is difficult for applicants for
interim injunctions to establish potential harm arising from anticipated stories
where there is no evidence as to actual content. A further case in the
High Court muddied the waters in the development of the new intrusion into
seclusion tort, while in another case, an interim injunction was granted. A
journalist was held not to be covered by the media exemption in the Privacy
Act 1993 in relation to gathering material for a book. The Court of Appeal
confirmed that breach of an historic suppression order by a website could be
the subject of a successful complaint to the Privacy Commissioner under the
Privacy Act.
In the area of official information, the government confirmed it will not
move forward with major reform of the Official Information regime suggested
by the Law Commission. However, a recent political scandal suggests
political manipulation of the regime is possible and at the least, there is a
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serious lack of appropriate process and protocols at the highest level. The
government also decided not to proceed with recommendations by the
Law Commission to develop one body to deal with regulation of media in
New Zealand. We now have a confusing three part system with different codes
and complaints processes.
Media continue to seek access to court records, testing the new regimes and
guidelines now in place. In general, the principle of open justice is balanced
as one factor in the process. Media tend not to be successful when they make
premature applications at a very early stage in the court process. As to filming
in court, media guidelines are currently being reviewed. During this process,
TV3 grossly breached the current guidelines by broadcasting footage that
should not have been captured during a prominent trial and using it as a
‘sideshow’. In court reporting, the High Court in Christchurch made a set of
suppression orders that had a rare blanketing effect on the proceedings, and are
likely to be challenged by media. The Court of Appeal confirmed the existence
of an inherent power to suppress names and evidence.
In contempt, a man was found liable for hyperlinking to information in
breach of a permanent injunction. The Law Commission issued an extensive
Issues Paper on the reform of the law of contempt, in which it suggested a
specific and limited statutory approach to sub judice contempt backed up by
appropriate offences, removal of scandalising the court from the law, and
specific regimes of education and strengthened instructions to jurors together
with appropriate offences.
The Broadcasting Standards Authority continued to uphold fewer
complaints and to impose no penalty in at least half of its decisions. Some of
its decisions struggled with reality programming and the arrival of ‘satirical’
news. The Press Council’s uphold rate dropped rather dramatically to nearer
its historical average of about 15%. The Council has made membership
available to non-newspaper digital media. The new Online Media Standards
Authority reached its first full decision (which was declined) and opened its
membership to two bloggers in addition to the original membership of
broadcasters with an online presence.
Finally, a prominent investigative journalist was subject to an extensive
warranted search under New Zealand’s new Search and Surveillance
legislation. He has claimed source privilege for all the material removed from
the premises and is challenging the validity and execution of the warrant.
Defamation
Liability as a publisher on the internet
In a recent case involving author and public figure, Joe Karam, Karam sued
media over comments on two websites which he pleaded suggested he lacked
integrity and behaved improperly by supporting David Bain, a man who was
acquitted of the murder of his family in a prominent retrial.1 Four articles in
newspapers and on media websites referred to an ongoing debate about the
acquittal and to statements made on a Facebook group and on another website.
1 Karam v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd, High Court, Auckland, CIV-2010-404-005021,
Associate Judge Osborne, 10 May 2012.
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The media articles generally did not repeat what was said on the sites, but
contained hyperlinks to them and to an online petition. The creator of one of
the sites was also quoted.
The court rejected an application by media for separate consideration of the
question of publication arising from hyperlinks. Fairfax referred to the recent
Canadian decision of Crookes v Newton to suggest that on the matter of
hyperlinks New Zealand law was clear and the claim should fall away. In
Crookes, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to find publication,2 at least in
relation to the inclusion of both deep and shallow hyperlinks in an online
article to websites containing allegedly defamatory material, likening
hyperlinks to footnotes. However, in Karam the New Zealand High Court did
not agree that New Zealand law will inevitably follow Crookes, so the
question remains open. Therefore media hyperlinking in a story to a website
containing defamatory material may amount to media actually publishing
what is on the website.
In Karam v Parker,3 Karam sued individuals for comments made on
Facebook, a website called Counterspin, Trademe and YouTube, suggesting he
was dishonest, fraudulent and lacking in integrity in relation to his support of
David Bain. Courtney J rejected an attempt by Mr Parker to argue that he was
merely an innocent disseminator under s 21 of the Defamation Act. Mr Parker
was a publisher because he was an active group administrator of the Facebook
page. He edited and removed comments and warned other posters about not
posting defamatory material. He eventually resigned as administrator when
matters got beyond his control but even after that point, continued in some
aspects of the role. Further, he had more control over the Counterspin website
which he set up as a moderated forum to tell what he saw as the other side of
the Bain retrial and its outcome. Due to the active control he exercised on both
sites, the judge found Mr Parker could not use an innocent dissemination
defence and could be liable for his own posts and those of third parties
published on the sites. The High Court made ex-All Black, businessman and
writer Joe Karam a total award of $525,000, being $340,500 compensatory
damages apportioned to the main defendant Mr Parker, and $184,500 to a Mr
Purkiss. The damages were for approximately 50 statements published online.
Justice Courtney held that the level of seriousness of the defamatory
statements suggested Mr Karam was dishonest, fraudulent and lacking in
integrity. She also awarded $10,000 in punitive damages and indemnity costs.
Notably, Mr Parker represented himself in the case and Mr Purkiss did not
appear at all. The award demonstrates how numerous publications online can
significantly increase damages awards.
In Wishart v Murray4 allegedly defamatory comments by anonymous third
parties were posted on a Facebook page established by the defendant, who had
also used Twitter to publicise the page. The page was set up to discuss the
impending release of a book co-authored by the plaintiff and the mother of
2 Crookes v Newton 2011 SCC 47, [2011] 3 SCR 269. The Supreme Court held that by
themselves, hyperlinks can never amount to publication, as to apply such a rule would make
those using hyperlinks presumptively liable and this would chill freedom of expression on
the internet.
3 Karam v Parker [2014] NZHC 737.
4 Discussed previously, [2013] NZHC 540, [2013] 3 NZLR 246.
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twins who died from non-accidental injuries in 2006 and whose killer was
never identified. The defendant argued the part of the claim relating to the
anonymous posts by third parties should be struck out because as the mere
host of the Facebook page, he was not a publisher. In the High Court,
Courtney J thought that such hosts will be publishers of anonymous postings
in two situations:
• where they know about the defamatory statement and fail to remove
it within a reasonable time such that it can be inferred they are taking
responsibility for the statement (the ‘actual knowledge and failure to
act test’); or
• where they do not know, but ought to, that defamatory statements are
likely in the circumstances (the ‘imputed knowledge test’).5
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected the second limb of this
approach, holding that a publisher would be required to have actual
knowledge.6 The court had numerous concerns which caused it to take this
position. First, it considered that an ‘ought to know’ test places a web host
who does not know of the defamatory comment in a worse position than a host
who actually does know, because the latter does not become a publisher until
a reasonable time for removal of the statement has passed and will not be a
publisher at all if the statement is removed in a reasonable time. In contrast,
a host lacking knowledge would be a publisher from the moment of posting
but is unable to avoid that outcome by removing the comment. This could be
seen as a form of strict liability, or liability based on a form of negligence. The
court was of the view that this goes against the character of defamation as an
intentional tort. Further, an ‘ought to know’ test could be in breach of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act requirement in s 14 to balance the right to
reputation against freedom of expression, tipping the balance too far in favour
of reputation. The imputed knowledge test was also seen as too uncertain, and
finally, a web host would probably not have access to an innocent
dissemination defence if found to be a publisher. The requirement for
publication in these circumstances is therefore a test of actual knowledge, with
the opportunity to escape liability by removing the offending material within
a reasonable time.
Development of public interest defence
Dooley v Smith7 discussed previously, has been appealed to the Court of
Appeal and it was hoped a higher court might endorse the expansion of
New Zealand’s constitutional qualified privilege defence into a full public
interest defence. It will be recalled that the New Zealand defence currently
protects discussion of MPs, past, present or future. The issue was completely
side-stepped by the Court of Appeal in Dooley, however, because the court
found all the statements involved were not actually defamatory to begin with,
so no defence was needed. This meant the matter of whether the defence could
be expanded was left for another day, although the Court of Appeal certainly
5 Wishart v Murray [2013] NZHC 540, [2013] 3 NZLR 246 at [117].
6 Murray v Wishart [2014] NZCA 461, [2014] 3 NZLR 722.
7 [2012] NZHC 529; Smith v Dooley [2013] NZCA 428; Dooley v Smith [2013] NZSC 155.
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did not close this issue down.8 Frustratingly, Dooley did not clarify matters a
great deal. However, it did show that a further High Court judge is prepared
to expand the defence and that the Court of Appeal is open to argument about
the issue.
Other High Court cases continue to develop the law. In October 2013, a
further decision emerged from the High Court which supports expansion of
constitutional qualified privilege. Cabral v Beacon Printing & Publishing9
involved a claim against the Whakatane Beacon newspaper and an individual
journalist. The Beacon published an article about a local development project
which the plaintiff was involved in funding, in the course of which it disclosed
details of old overseas convictions of the plaintiff and mentioned
investigations into alleged misuse of funds by trustees of a connected trust.
The plaintiff argued the inclusion of this information in the article gave an
inaccurate defamatory impression of her. In an application to strike out the
defence the court felt it had sufficient information before it to decide that
qualified privilege was unavailable. This was not because the article was not
about an MP, but because it was not of sufficient public interest. In other
words, the court treated the defence as one on public interest, but found it
could not apply to the facts because the published story was not in fact a
public interest story.
In expanding the subject matter of the defence, the court said ‘there may be
other matters of public interest, for which the media may properly invoke the
privilege’. The Court of Appeal recognised this in Lange v Atkinson.10
However, it then went on to point out that matters of general interest alone will
not be of sufficient public interest.11 The court found the article here was of
local interest, it touched on matters in which some local people were involved
including payment of monies, and as such, it was newsworthy. But this was
not the same as public interest. That required something more – something so
important that it entitled the defendants to tell the readers about it even though
it defamed the plaintiff and was not true.12 Cabral suggests two important
things about the developing defence – first, it can extend to matters of public
interest, but second, the threshold for a story to cross into public interest is
quite high. It is perhaps surprising that the story in Cabral did not cross the
threshold. The story appears more than newsworthy and also comparable to
overseas cases where public interest stories have been found to exist.13 A
public interest defence will be of limited use if the question of what is in the
public interest is defined narrowly, as has happened in Australia where the
8 Smith v Dooley [2013] NZCA 428 at [74]. An attempted appeal to the Supreme Court, failed
on the grounds that the differences between the High Court and the Court of Appeal
judgments amounted to matters of fact, which would not be revisited on appeal: Dooley v
Smith [2013] NZSC 155 at [4].
9 [2013] NZHC 2684.
10 Ibid at [28]; Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 at 445.
11 Ibid at [29].
12 Ibid.
13 Eg, in the English case, GKR Karate (UK) Limited v Yorkshire Post Newspapers Ltd [2000]
2 All ER 931, [2000] 1 WLR 2571, a public interest defence was successful in relation to a
story in a weekly, free community newspaper that was distributed to 158,000 houses and
businesses in the Leeds area discussing the issue of the local selling of karate lessons door
to door.
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defence is confined to government or political matters and has to be linked to
the constitutional system of representative government.14
Cabral has been followed by a slightly more cautious decision of the
High Court in Karam v Parker,15 where Courtney J ruled that the defence did
not extend to protect statements made online about well-known sportsman,
businessman and writer, Joe Karam. The judge accepted the possibility of
extension of the defence and noted that discussion of local government issues
might be within the idea of political expression, but concluded it would be
going too far to also include statements posted on websites established to
facilitate the free exchange of ideas on matters that interest members of the
public.16 The court differentiated between mainstream media and new media,
implying that the latter will find it difficult to claim the defence. Facebook is
described in the judgment as facilitating the mere exchange of views rather
than making available to the public information that is not readily available as
traditional media do.17 Further, the court considered that although the
defendant had set up a website called Counterspin as a vehicle to publically
express his views about the David Bain case, it did not appear to give rise to
a duty to do so. It is arguable the High Court in Karam v Parker18 took too
restrictive an approach to possible expansion of the defence. To focus on a
need for a duty/interest relationship is seemingly misplaced. The Lange
defence defined the subject matter to which it could apply, meaning that if the
subject matter is right, then the duty/interest relationship is taken to exist even
for information that is published to a mass audience. Furthermore, in
favouring traditional media over new media, the decision sidelines the
increasingly important public interest functions of new media.
This growing body of High Court decisions suggesting openness to a public
interest defence is yet to be tested by a superior court. However, the law
appears to be consolidating around the issue, with public interest defences
being filed in response to new claims.
A further challenging issue is that the defence can be lost by ill will or
taking improper advantage of the occasion of publication.19 In Smith v
Dooley20 the Court of Appeal dealt with ill will and taking improper advantage
separately, as required by case law.21 It found that letters to media and
opposition to the way a special trust was being run were not evidence of ill
will, but of genuine concern about governance, while the fact that the
defendant had taken care to check the facts before authorising a newspaper to
publish his comments meant there had been no recklessness and hence no
taking improper advantage.
14 Eg, Popovic v Herald and Weekly Times [2003] VSCA 161, (2003) 9 VR 1 (although there
was a difference of opinion on the point in the Court of Appeal).
15 [2014] NZHC 737.
16 Ibid at [210].
17 Ibid at [211] – [212].
18 [2014] NZHC 737.
19 Defamation Act 1992, s 19.
20 [2013] NZCA 428 at [73]-[91], See also Du Claire v Palmer[2012] NZHC 934 at
[120]-[123].
21 Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385.
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In Karam v Parker,22 the High Court considered whether, if the
constitutional qualified privilege defence had been available, it would have
been lost due to ill will or improper use. Courtney J found against Mr Parker
and suggested that the nature of publication in new media may give rise to a
need for greater responsibility due to the ability to publish widely and
indefinitely and to manipulate accessibility, such as by formatting a site to
give prominence in Google search results, as Mr Parker stated he had done.
The implication of this finding is that it will be harder to those in Mr Parker’s
shoes to show they have not misused the opportunity to publish online.
Honest opinion and statements published online
In Karam v Fairfax New Zealand Limited,23 where the newspaper published
a story containing links to an allegedly defamatory website, the court
recognised that extremely odd or biased views will be opinions for the purpose
of a defence, provided the media defendant has no reasonable cause to believe
the opinions are not genuinely held. Thus, the opinion may be unusual,
extreme or damaging, but the defendant need not prove the opinion was in fact
a genuine opinion, only that there was reasonable cause to believe this was so.
Since in this case, any opinion involved was that of the website creators and
not the media, Fairfax had to show the opinion was not its own and there was
nothing to alert it to the possibility that it was not the genuine opinion of the
author.24 The judge took a broader approach to the pleaded facts than that
suggested by the claimant in this action to strike out the defence, and held that
using the facts in its pleaded schedule, Fairfax might able to prove it had no
reasonable cause to believe that the opinion was not the genuine opinion of the
authors.
Qualified privilege for fair and accurate reports of court
proceeding
In Rafiq v Google New Zealand Ltd25 verbatim reproduction of excerpts of a
judgment on a blog post were held likely to be covered by the qualified
privilege for accurate reports of court proceedings defence. The blog quoted
exact passages in a decision of the Human Rights Review Tribunal. While it
did not reproduce the entire judgment, the court accepted the context of the




In Slater v APN New Zealand Ltd26 the High Court granted an injunction to
prominent blogger Cameron Slater under a claim in both privacy and breach
22 [2014] NZHC 737.
23 [2012] NZHC 887 at [47]-[49].
24 Defamation Act 1992, s 10(2)(b).
25 [2014] NZHC 551 at [21]. The decision was on a preliminary application for security for
costs.
26 [2014] NZHC 2157.
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of confidence, to prevent unknown persons from publishing his email
correspondence obtained by illegal computer hacking. However, media which
had received information from the hacker and had not been involved in the
hacking were not restrained from publishing any information they already
held. Slater later abandoned the claim against media after receiving an
undertaking not to publish any of the material in which there was no genuine
public interest – this was stated by the court to cover information about the
plaintiff’s wife and children, his medical records, the death of his mother and
information of a similar nature.
Interim injunction
Further to previous discussion of a case where the Earthquake Commission
(EQC) obtained an interim injunction prohibiting the publication of
information released by accident which contained details of repair plans and
estimates for repair costs for thousands of Christchurch homes,27 the
Commission has successfully obtained a permanent injunction against the
blogger who made the information available online after he outed himself. In
Earthquake Commission v Krieger28 the court applied a qualification of the
rule that where government wants to take advantage of the protections offered
by the private law of confidence, it must prove the public interest justifies this.
It did this by asking first, whether EQC was close enough to core government
activity to be equated with government, and second, was the nature of the
information in question such that there would be no need for EQC to establish
public interest in restraining it.
The court answered the first question in the affirmative by looking at EQC’s
role as a Crown agent under the Crown Entities Act 2004 and at its board
membership and accountability to a Minister. It found EQC is not a
government department but it is an integral part of central government. On the
second question, the court used the views of the Chief Ombudsman in a 2012
ruling that EQC did not have to disclose estimated repair costs to a claimant29
to hold that the spreadsheet simply contained ordinary commercially sensitive
information, as well as private information about claimants. The court
concluded the information was therefore not information ‘relating to
government’ which carried an onus of establishing that restraint would be into
the public interest.
It is unclear this apparently new qualification is a real one, or what purpose
it serves. This is because arguably there is very high public interest in
government restraining publication of commercially sensitive information and
private information it has collected. In the first category of information, the
reason it is commercially sensitive at all is because it directly impacts on how
much public tax revenue will need to be expended. That is not like private
sector commercial sensitivity. In the second category, private information does
not cease to be private because it is collected and held by a government, but
in being held, it becomes government–related because the government
27 Earthquake Commission v Unknown Defendants [2013] NZHC 708.
28 [2014] 2 NZLR 547 at [36]-[43].
29 Dame Beverley Wakem Official Information Case Note: Request for EQC Cost Estimates
(February 2012).
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becomes custodian of it in a particular form and can use it for particular public
good purposes. Further, there is great public interest in governments
protecting the masses of private information collected about their citizens for
government purposes. Release would be outside of those purposes, thus
supporting the public interest in restraint. What is more, without a guarantee
of protection, the government would be unable to collect this information and
therefore to govern.
It is arguable, then, that contrary to what the High Court suggested in the
Krieger case, both sorts of information did ‘relate to’ government in a very
direct way. There was obvious public interest in restraining such information,
and no reason why government should not have been called upon to establish
this, in recognition of the fact that it should be rare for a private law claim to
be exploited by a public claimant. However, in the event, the burden fell on
Mr Krieger to establish the defence, which he was unable to do. It was held
there was no public interest in publication of the details of repair work and
quotes required for individual Christchurch properties following serious
earthquakes. Some members of the public might have a prurient interest in
checking the details of their neighbours’ properties, but otherwise, public
understanding and discussion of government activities was not promoted.30
Mr Krieger was eventually fined for contempt, which is detailed below.
Difficulties of establishing public interest to defend an
application for an interim injunction
In an application to restrain Maori Television from screening a programme
disclosing certain credit card use by a publicly funded trust, an interim
injunction was granted and initially extended even though it appeared there
was an arguable defence based on alleged mis-spending of public funds.31
This is not uncommon where a court does not have the benefit of full
evidence, or cross-examination, as in this case, which was an urgent
application. Fortunately, the application was eventually withdrawn. The
question then arose whether media could publish the affidavit evidence
produced for the application.32 The court held that there is no general reason
why a defendant may not make public reference to affidavit evidence filed in
support of a now-abandoned injunction application against it, as long as the
evidence has been volunteered as an exhibit to an affidavit rather than obtained
under the discovery rules33 and no non-party has made separate application to
protect other confidential or privacy interests.34
30 Earthquake Commission v Krieger [2013] NZHC 3140, [2014] 2 NZLR 547. See also
Earthquake Commission v Unknown Defendants [2013] NZHC 708; Solicitor-General v
Krieger [2014] NZHC 172.
31 Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board v Maori Television Service [2013] NZHC 2490 and
2630.
32 Ibid.
33 Rule 8.30(4) of the High Court Rules requires that discovered evidence can only be used for
the purposes of the proceedings.
34 Te Kohanga Reo National Trust Board v Maori Television Service [2013] NZHC 2490 and
2630 at [24]-[26].
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Privacy
Refusal of interim injunction against media
In 2014, the High Court declined an urgent application for an interim
injunction to prevent the publication of an anticipated story in the New
Zealand Herald about discord within the intended plaintiff’s extended family
following the death of her mother.35 With little evidence before the court and
a story that had not yet been written, the intended plaintiff was unable to
establish any substantive information that she had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in. Accordingly, it followed that suggestions of general discord in the
family if published would not be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Against this, the court weighed the Herald’s freedom of expression, in a
balancing exercise much like that carried out in the UK, and found in favour
of the newspaper. The court noted that particularly where there is little
knowledge of the content of the intended article, it will be a serious matter to
try to injunct media. The standard to be met before such injunctions are
granted was referred to as high and was not met in this case, although the
judge acknowledged the potential distress and embarrassment of the claimant.
Justice Katz commented that the requirements of the tort ‘are such that
successful claims are likely to be fairly rare.’36
However, as discussed under breach of confidence above, in Slater v APN
New Zealand Ltd,37 the High Court granted an injunction to prominent blogger
Cameron Slater to prevent unknown persons from publishing email
correspondence obtained by illegal computer hacking, although media were
not prevented from publishing material already held.
Intrusion upon seclusion tort
I referred previously to the ground-breaking High Court decision in C v
Holland which recognised an action for intrusion upon seclusion.38 Other
High Court decisions in the area are emerging which demonstrate lack of
agreement about the development of this tort in New Zealand. In Faesenkloet
v Jenkins,39 the tort arose in the context of a neighbour dispute, where the
plaintiff objected to the operation of a camera installed on the roof of a garage
adjacent to a driveway running to his property. The camera filmed the
plaintiff’s land and public land and could therefore capture images of people
using the driveway although this did not amount to clear images. Justice Asher
in the High Court was of the opinion that invasion in the context of the tort
could extend to a public place.40 However, the court then appeared to attempt
to push the two New Zealand torts back together by holding that although
there is a distinction between unlawful publication of private facts and
intrusion into seclusion, it is far from clear that there needs to be different torts
35 Chatwin v APN News & Media Ltd [2014] NZHC 11 (20 January 2014).
36 Ibid at [28].
37 [2014] NZHC 2152 and 2157.
38 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672.
39 [2014] NZHC 1637.
40 Faesenkloet v Jenkins [2014] NZHC 1637 at [37].
New Zealand media law update 383
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 82 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Wed Jan 28 11:23:28 2015
/journals/journal/malr/vol19pt4/part_4
for both.41 Instead, the court focused on what it saw as the common elements
of: facts for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and publicity
or an intrusion, which would be considered highly offensive to an objective,
reasonable person. The court held that the claim failed because there could be
no reasonable expectation of privacy given the public ownership and use of
the driveway, and on the facts, the intrusion by the camera was not objectively
highly intrusive. The plaintiff’s claim failed. This attempt to formulate a grand
tort may be premature and would be better provided for in statute. Although
it could be said that currently, some applications of the publication tort in fact
protect against forms of harassment as well,42 the development of a separate
tort of intrusion into seclusion allows for doctrinal clarity and clear
denunciation of the particular behaviour that is unlawful. For journalists, that
is helpful, because one tort is about editorial judgment and the publication
decision, and the other is about newsgathering activity.
More recently, in the Slater case,43 Fogarty J, in the High Court, granted an
urgent injunction against unknown persons to prevent publication of hacked
emails, and referred briefly to Holland as authority demonstrating that courts
will respond to novel facts of unwanted invasions of privacy.44 Computer or
phone hacking is analogous to accessing a bank account, which has been
recognised in Canada as a form of intrusion into seclusion.45
In January 2014, David Bain, a public figure tried twice and acquitted of the
murder of his family, was harassed by media which surrounded the site of his
private wedding, possibly trespassed, and also took images of it from four
helicopters circling during the ceremony.46 Arguably these actions could have
been the subject of an intrusion into privacy claim.
Media exemption from Privacy Act 1993
New Zealand’s data protection legislation contains an exemption for media, to
the effect that privacy principles do not apply to the media in general in
relation to gathering, preparing and broadcasting or publishing news for
public broadcast. Section 2 of the Privacy Act 1993 provides:
Agency does not include in relation to its news activities, any news medium
News activity means—
(a) the gathering of news, or the preparation or compiling of articles or
programmes of or concerning news, observations on news or current affairs,
for the purposes of dissemination to the public or any section of the public;
(b) the dissemination, to the public or any section of the public, of any article or
programme of or concerning:
41 Faesenkloet v Jenkins [2014] NZHC 1637 at [38]- [39].
42 See eg, the ‘mundane activities in public places’ cases such as Murray v Express
Newspapers plc [2007] EWHC 1908 and Weller v Associated Newspapers [2014] All ER (D)
142 (Apr), [2014] EWHC 1163 and injunction cases like A v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd, HC,
Wellington, CIV-2011-485-569, 28 and 29 March 2011.
43 Slater v APN New Zealand Ltd [2014] NZHC 2157.
44 Ibid at [6].
45 Jones v Tsige [2012] ONCA 32, (2012) 108 OR (3d) 241.
46 Stuff website, David Bain has tied the knot at
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/9595893/David-Bain-has-tied-the-knot> (accessed 8 May
2014).
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(i) news;
(ii) observations on news;
(iii) current affairs.
A broad approach to the definition has been accepted at High Court level.47
However, the High Court more recently held that the exception does not apply
to a journalist who collected information about a person during interviews
carried out for the purpose of research for a book about the person. The
journalist was employed by a newspaper but was held to be publishing the
book in a private capacity. Further, the journalist was held to be not engaged
in a news activity, because the definition refers to the compiling of articles or
programmes, not books.48 Although the case could be confined to special facts
concerning discovery procedure, media were concerned about this decision. It
appears the definition in the Privacy Act may be too narrow in this respect. I
have discussed previously the Law Commission’s report on the Privacy Act,
which included a recommendation that the definition of ‘news media’ in the
Act be amended to exclude from that exemption media that are not subject to
a code of ethics which deals expressly with privacy and includes a complaints
procedure. The government has announced it will implement most of the Law
Commission recommendations, including giving the Privacy Commissioner
more proactive powers to allow the office to order agencies to comply with the
law, to provide personal information to requesters where there is no lawful
basis for withholding it, and to create a legal responsibility to report material
data breaches to the office, and also to report serious breaches to affected
individuals.49 However, the question of the media exemption has
unfortunately fallen out of the reform process, just at a time when it appears
it should be given full consideration.
Suppression and privacy
It appears information that is the subject of a suppression order could be the
basis of a complaint to the Privacy Commissioner. In Sensible Sentencing
Group Trust v the Human Rights Review Tribunal,50 the Court of Appeal
rejected a judicial review challenge to the power of the tribunal to deal with
a complaint about the naming of an individual on the appellant’s website as a
sex offender. The individual had complained to the Privacy Commissioner that
the naming was in breach of an historical suppression order. The existence or
otherwise of the suppression order was disputed as the evidence disclosed
only an interim order with no evidence as to discharge or otherwise. However,
the Court of Appeal held it might be possible for the director of the tribunal
to establish that there had been a breach of Privacy Principles 6, 8 and 11 in
47 Lau v ACP Media Ltd [2013] NZHC 1165 at [17]-[22].
48 Dotcom v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 1343 at [57]-[77].
49 Privacy Commissioner Annual Report 2014, p 9, at
<https://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Reports-to-ParlGovt/OPC-annual-report-2014-
web3.pdf> (accessed 4 December 2014), Ministry of Justice, Reforming the Privacy Act
1993, Cabinet Paper, 13 May 2014, at <http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-
publications/r/reforming-the-privacy-act-1993> (accessed 15 December 2014).
50 [2014] NZCA 264.
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the Privacy Act because an unknown police employee had unlawfully dealt
with the personal information by downloading it from the police database and
passing it on to the trust.51
Official information
Review of legislative regime
The previous update detailed the recommendations of the Law Commission
final report on the New Zealand’s 30 year old official information regime.52
The government has responded to the paper, and advised that major legislative
reform of the official information legislation will not be progressed. However,
it did agree to extending the reach of the OIA to information relating to the
administrative functions of the courts. This would not include information
about matters before the courts, or the performance and functions of the
judiciary. In the meantime, operation of the official information legislation
will be kept under review and may be given effect as competing priorities
allow.53
NZSIS inquiry into official information request
Recent political scandals have involved concerns about political influence in
the Official Information regime. The Inspector General of the New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service has recently reported on an inquiry carried out as
to how a prominent blogger was able to receive an almost immediate response
from the SIS to an Official Information request, whereas media had a similar
request initially denied and then responded to the following day, thus giving
an exclusive story to the blogger.54 The report found that the SIS had disclosed
incomplete, inaccurate and misleading information in response to the Official
Information Act requests by the blogger and others, and it had provided much
the same information, together with further detail, to the Prime Minister and
the Prime Minister’s Office. As a result, the then Leader of the Opposition was
criticised by the blogger and other commentators and by news media and the
Public Service Association. No clarification or correction was provided once
the effect of the errors became apparent. The SIS also wrongly failed to treat
the media requests for the same information as OIA requests but simply
denied them, which effectively allowed the blogger an exclusive news story.
51 See above p 384 (Privacy Act)
52 The Public’s Right to Know: Review of the Offıcial Information Legislation (NZLC R125,
2012).
53 Ministry of Justice, Government response to Law Commission report ‘The public’s right to
know: Review of the offıcial information legislation’, 4 February 2013 at
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/g/government-response-to-
law-commission-report-on-the-publics-right-to-know-review-of-the-official-information-
legislation> (accessed 15 December 2014).
54 See Cheryl Gwyn Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, Report into the release of
information by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service in July and August 2011, 25
November 2014 at <http://www.igis.govt.nz/assets/FINAL-REPORT-INTO-THE-
RELEASE-OF-INFORMATION-BY-NZSIS-IN-JULY-AND-AUGUST-2.pdf> (accessed 5
December 2014) . See also N Hager, Dirty Politics, Craig Potton Publishing, Nelson, 2014,
Ch 3.
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Therefore the SIS process for handling OIA requests was inadequate and there
was a mistaken understanding of OIA obligations, particularly in relation to
the need for consultation with the Leader of the Opposition as to the accuracy
of the information to be disclosed and whether and how to release that
information. Further, the SIS did not have appropriate processes and protocols
for the maintenance of security and political neutrality in its relationship with
the Prime Minister’s Office. Among other things, the Inspector recommended
that the SIS should provide an apology to the then-Leader of the Opposition,
the Hon Phil Goff. The report has caused some disquiet as to the potential for
political misuse of the OI regime.
Regulation of the media
Regulation in the new media age
I referred in the last update to the Law Commission paper – ‘the News Media
Meets New Media’, released in March 2013,55 where the Commission
recommended that the current complex system of media regulation be
replaced with one over-arching regulator with incentivised ‘voluntary’
membership. The government agreed to implement the cyberbullying
recommendations in the report,56 but later rejected the recommendations for a
new super-regulator. Minister Judith Collins said that unlike recent reviews in
the UK and Australia, the Law Commission’s report was not driven by a crisis
of confidence in the mainstream media, and she thinks the media in New
Zealand have already made good progress in dealing with various challenges.
Perhaps influenced by regulatory standoffs between government and media
overseas, the New Zealand government has concluded there is no pressing
need for statutory or institutional change currently. This is unfortunate, as we
now have three different regulatory bodies dealing with speech harms, each
based on different codes, standards, principles or elements of liability. This
system is likely to be further complicated when the Harmful Digital
Publications Bill is passed and a further regulatory system based on a
mediating agency with recourse to the District Court is put in place for online
speech only. One comprehensive regulatory body dealing with all harmful
speech would be easier for the public to locate, and one standard complaints
process based on a single code of practice would be far more accessible than
currently. While it is certainly true that it is much more difficult to get
agreement and buy-in to grand regulatory schemes from the stakeholders
involved, in the long run, they give greater coherence, fairness and efficiency
to the law.
55 New Zealand Law Commission, The News Media Meets ’New Media’: Rights,
Responsibilities and Regulation in the Digital Age (NZLC R128, 2013) at
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/project/review-regulatory-gaps-and-new-
media?quicktabs_23=report> (accessed 14 June 2014).
56 See Scoop website, Time’s Up For Cyber Bullies at
<http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1304/S00048/times-up-for-cyber-bullies.htm> (accessed
14 June 2013) and the Harmful Digital Communications Bill 2013, 168-2,
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/bill/government/2013/0168/latest/resultsin.aspx?search=sw
_096be8ed80e2ec61_Maori_25_se&p=>1> (accessed 15 December 2014).
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Court reporting
Developments in access to court records
Access to court records is dealt with in New Zealand in two sets of rules.
There are three underlying principles for the rules. First, prior to judgment or
verdict, allegations made in pleadings and indictments are unproven and
permission of the court should be required where non-parties seek access to
ensure parties are protected from publication of statements that may ultimately
be found to lack substance. Secondly, during committal, at trial or at full
hearing, open justice should be given effect by a generous and responsive
approach, to enable media to perform their legitimate functions of reporting
court proceedings. Thirdly, the verdict or judgment is the formal and definitive
record of the decision of the court. Access to other material by non-parties,
such as excluded evidence, requires permission of the court.
The criminal jurisdiction is covered by the Criminal Procedure Rules
2012,57 while the civil jurisdiction is covered by the High Court Rules 2009.58
The first decision reported under the 2012 criminal rules was declined.59 In
two applications, media sought access to a psychologist’s report, and to all
documents on the present court file, prior to completion of the trial. Both
applications were declined, the first because the psychologist’s report
contained much confidential material and the second, very broad application,
because there was other confidential material throughout the file. Unfocused,
fishing expedition applications of this kind are unlikely to succeed. The
judgment also indicates that media arguments that access to the file is needed
in order to report on the case immediately after the trial are unlikely to be
persuasive. A similar approach is taken by the Court of Appeal, which draws
on the High Court Rules to inform its decisions on non-party access to
documents filed in that court.60
In civil proceedings involving an international trade dispute, Radio New
Zealand, the Wall Street Journal and an Australian based reporter from
Bloomberg News sought a copy of a statement of claim or access to the court
file in litigation that had only just been filed.61 The plaintiff did not object but
the defendant did. The judge took the prevailing New Zealand approach where
open justice is not paramount but is considered as one of six factors to be dealt
with in a non-hierarchical fashion.62 Although there had been considerable
publicity about the events leading to the litigation, a stay of proceedings was
currently being considered and this meant none of the court documents
containing the parties’ positions and arguments might ever see the light of day.
57 Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, Part 6, Access to court documents, Rules 6.1-6.10, (called
Criminal Rules).
58 High Court Rules 2009, Part 3, Subpart 2, Access to court documents, Rules 3.5-3.16 (called
Civil Rules).
59 Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Robertson [2014] NZHC 1526 and Chief
Executive of the Department of Corrections v Robertson [2014] NZHC 1621.
60 Patterson v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 4, [2013] NZAR 136; Schenker
AG v Commerce Commission [2013] NZCA 114. The court has its own rules: the Court of
Appeal (Access to Court Documents) Rules 2009.
61 Danone Asia Pacific Holdings PTE Ltd v Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2014] NZHC
393.
62 Schenker AG v Commerce Commission [2013] NZCA 114.
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A potential arbitration process could be placed in jeopardy by disclosure.
Open justice therefore had less significance where the dispute might not ever
be heard by the court. The court concluded that the release of more detailed
information outside of what was already in the public arena could await the
statement of claim and of defence in the event the dispute was heard by the
court.
In Rice v Heaney63 a business publication, the National Business Review,
sought access to a proceedings file involving matters relating to the dissolution
of a partnership, and argued that full and accurate reporting required access
because one of the parties was a partner at a firm which was paid ratepayers’
money through work for a council on leaky buildings. Access was refused due
to the early stages of the proceedings, the presence on the file of commercially
sensitive and private information, the possibility that publication would
threaten any prospect of extra-judicial resolution, and the intrinsically private
nature of the dispute, which did not actually affect the council or ratepayers.
Access to the file was refused although a minute dealing with procedural and
timetable directions was made accessible.
The Human Rights Review Tribunal, which has adopted the civil rules for
its proceedings, allowed an application from a New Zealand Herald journalist
for access to the tribunal’s file during proceedings arising from a complaint
about a breach of privacy.64 However, in that case, neither party objected to
the application for access. Copying of documents disclosed in an interim
hearing well-attended by media was also allowed, to be charged on an actual
cost basis and carried out under court supervision. Media access was also not
to inhibit access to the court file by the tribunal, and media were required to
observe existing suppression orders.
Filming in court — In-court media guidelines
Media guidelines are currently being reviewed following publicised concerns
from the Criminal Bar,65 and a consultation paper has been issued.66 It does
not appear major change is required to the Guidelines, though informed
fine-tuning may be useful. However, while this review was going on,
behaviour of TV3 during the filming of a prominent trial demonstrated how
the Guidelines can be abused in a way that is not fair and balanced reporting.67
During the trial of the Honourable John Banks on a charge connected with a
false electoral expenses return, Justice Wylie withdrew filming rights and
ordered TV3/Mediaworks not to use any footage captured in the courtroom in
its coverage of the balance of the trial. These orders were made because TV3
had broadcast footage obtained in court on its evening news programme
63 [2014] NZHC 1311.
64 Director of Human Rights Proceedings v The Sensible Sentencing Group Trust [2013]
NZHRRT 20.
65 See C MacLennan, Cameras keep court an open book, NZ Herald, 4 April 2014, at
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11231712> (accessed 20
May 2014).
66 See Courts of New Zealand, In-Court Media Coverage – a consultation paper, 6 March
2014, at <http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/In-Court-Media-Review/In-Court-Media-
Coverage_-_consultation-paper_.pdf> (accessed 20 May 2014).
67 R v Banks [2014] NZHC 1155.
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appearing to show Mr Banks placing one of his fingers in his ear, removing his
finger from his ear, looking at his finger and then putting his finger in his
mouth. Although Mr Banks did not complain, the judge considered the
broadcast was a ‘sideshow broadcast seemingly to entertain’ and was intended
to expose Mr Banks to ridicule and/or derision. Further, it had no news value
and lacked any public interest.68 The camera had been recording at a time not
within the guidelines and was being operated by TVNZ although no film had
been broadcast by TVNZ. TV3 was held to be in breach of the guidelines and
lost any further right to broadcast film from the trial. This incident did not
reflect well on the media involved. The judgment of the court was ultimately
referred to the Guidelines Review Committee.
Suppression orders
Blanket suppression orders
In 2014, the High Court in Christchurch made rare orders at a sentencing
hearing suppressing almost all details of the victims of a murderer and their
families. This included the summary of facts concerning the rape and murder,
and the name of the victim, and the victim impact statement read in court and
the others handed to the judge. The grounds were undue hardship arising from
invasion of privacy.69 Victims had been approached by media and made it
clear at the sentencing they did not want to give interviews. Media have
indicated they will seek to have the orders reviewed.
Requirement to establish extreme hardship
Extreme hardship is required before discretion is exercised in favour of name
suppression. In R v Wilson involving a 17 year old offender whose mental
health was at risk, the matter was finely balanced. However, ultimately the
youth of the defendant, impact on her rehabilitation and predicted significant
emotional distress did not reach the threshold in the context of a serious
blackmail offence.70 In another case following conviction for theft as a
personal servant, the first limb was not satisfied, even though the appellant’s
surname was rare and her son was readily identifiable and could be the target
of further teasing and bullying behaviour at school. No professional report
about the son’s state had been put before the court.71 In X v Police,72 however,
the court found that publication of the name and address of the appellant
would cause extreme hardship to his wife and their three young children, the
wife having just given birth in stressful circumstances and the children being
extremely young. This was so even when, when the second limb of the test
68 R v Banks [2014] NZHC 1155 at [33].
69 R v McDonald [2014] NZHC 2054. See The Press, Murderer Aaron McDonald is jailed for
21 years, at <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/10431938/Murderer-Aaron-McDonald-is-
jailed-for-21-years> (accessed 28 August 2014).
70 R v Wilson [2014] NZHC 32. Justice Whata suggested that the reporting of the matter must
be careful to accurately record Ms Wilson’s culpability and acknowledge her youth, and that
the value placed on open reporting is undermined by even the slightest hyperbole and the
unfair harm caused by it: [47].
71 Rougeux v Police [2014] NZHC 979. See also RM v Police [2012] NZHC 2080; K v Inland
Revenue Department [2013] NZHC 2426.
72 X v Police [2014] NZHC 935.
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was applied, the hardship to the wife was weighed against the benefit of open
reporting in the context of sexual offending against children.
Inherent power to suppress
The existence of an inherent power in criminal cases to suppress names and
evidence has been examined exhaustively recently by the Supreme Court,
which found by majority that it definitively exists in a case involving
publication of a suppressed judgment on a website.73 This power is referred to
as an inherent power to make non-party suppression orders. In the case itself,
an entire judgment had been suppressed in order to protect the right to a fair
trial. The court observed that the power to bind non-parties by suppression
may cover judgments and things such as evidence which one party wants to
adduce but which has been held inadmissible, and facts such as a defendant’s
prior criminal record.74 Although the case involved the previous law, the court
also commented on the Criminal Procedure Act regime and the relationship of
the new provisions with the inherent powers. It noted that the new scheme is
not a code and so has not ousted any inherent power, except perhaps to the
extent that the newly specified grounds for exercising the discretion under the
Act might do so.75 In the same case, the Supreme Court made it clear courts
have an inherent power to make non-party suppression orders in civil
proceedings, although it emphasised that what is being referred to is the
inherent power of the court rather than inherent jurisdiction.76 In Ridge v
Parore77 the High Court held that the parties had an onus of establishing that
there were exceptional circumstances relating to them, personally, that could
displace the principle of open justice to allow suppression of their names in a
civil proceeding. APN New Zealand Ltd, which was seeking to set aside a
very broad suppression order, was successful in relation to the parties’ names.
However, the court allowed the continued suppression of information
identifying the celebrity couple’s children and sensitive financial information.
Individual responsibility
It is clear courts are reluctant to convict media, but wish to encourage
responsibility where possible. In March 2014, Fairfax media was convicted
and fined $2250 for breach of a suppression order made by a coroner. The
editor of the Waikato Times was also charged, but was granted a discharge
73 Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] 3 NZLR 441.
74 Ibid at [146].
75 Ibid at [137(d)] and [169], referring to ss 200, 202 and 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act
2011. The statutory power to clear the court has specifically ousted the inherent power,
however: Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 197(4).
76 Ibid at [113] and [173(d)]; Siemer v Solicitor-General [2012] 3 NZLR 43. See also Mafart
v Television New Zealand [2006] NZSC 33, [2006] 3 NZLR 18 at [16] and Muir v
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2004) 17 PRNZ 365 (CA). In Norsworthy v Police [2013]
NZHC 2550, an application for suppression of the appellant’s connection with an ongoing
police investigation where no charges had yet been laid was dealt with under the inherent
power but was declined.
77 [2013] NZAR 1355.
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without conviction and ordered to pay $500 to the subject of the order for the
emotional harm the breach had caused.78
Contempt
Contempt liability and hyperlinking
In Solicitor-General v Krieger79 a contempt application filed by the
Solicitor-General arising from a civil proceeding initiated by the Earthquake
Commission against Mr Krieger was successful. The Earthquake Commission
had obtained an interim injunction and subsequently a permanent injunction
restraining disclosure of information in a spreadsheet inadvertently sent by it
to another person. Mr Krieger received a copy of the spreadsheet and
deliberately provided internet access to the contents by providing a hyperlink.
In deciding whether there can be liability for contempt by third party
publishers, the court held the issue is to be assessed in a manner similar to
assessing participation in a crime. Where a clearly expressed prohibition
exists, the evaluation of an alleged breach is to be robust and reflect the
practical reality. The issue is therefore one of causation. Here, contempt was
found because Mr Krieger’s publication of the hyperlinks in fact facilitated
disclosure of the spreadsheet. Further, the fact that all, or some, of the websites
were overseas was irrelevant, as disclosure of the information occurred in
New Zealand when EQC claimants downloaded it. Mr Krieger was fined
$5,000.
Sub judice contempt
In the last update, I noted the government referred a wide-ranging review of
New Zealand’s contempt laws to the Law Commission. The Commission has
issued an interim report80 and reached a preliminary view on sub judice
contempt that some change is needed because there are significant conceptual
and practical problems in applying the current real risk test and reasoning in
the age of the internet, and there is lack of clarity around the threshold for
contempt. The Commission proposes a very specific statutory approach to
these issues. The first part would be a new statutory provision prohibiting the
publication or reporting of a defendant’s previous convictions and any
concurrent charges during a specified period leading up to the trial for an
offence unless an order is made by the court permitting publication. (It would
be a statutory offence to breach the provision.) The Commission thinks this
sort of information is almost always prejudicial and interferes with the courts’
authority to decide what evidence should be admissible. However, it would
leave an exceptional power to allow publication where, for example, there is
no real risk. The Commission goes on to suggest a statutory provision under
78 Stuff website, Fairfax fined for suppression breach, 26 March 2014, at
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/9871017/Fairfax-fined-for-suppression-breach> (accessed
28 May 2014).
79 [2014] NZHC 172. See also Earthquake Commission v Unknown Defendants [2013] NZHC
708 and Earthquake Commission v Krieger [2014] 2 NZLR 547, discussed under breach of
confidence above.
80 Contempt in Modern New Zealand, LCIP 36, May 2014.
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which a court could suppress any other information during the period leading
up to a trial if satisfied that suppression of that information is necessary to
protect a person’s right to a fair trial. (It would be a statutory offence to breach
a suppression order.) This would basically put what exists now into a statute.
Further, a statutory offence that would cover any publication that (regardless
of whether it also breached the previous provisions) created a real risk, as
distinct from a remote possibility, of interference with the administration of
justice by prejudicing a fair trial, is proposed. The courts would have
discretion to define the limits of the test in the unique circumstances of each
case. It is hard to see how this adds anything new to the existing law, or makes
it more certain. The new statutory provisions would also include a system
providing for take-down orders where a publication breached one of the
provisions.
Scandalising the court
In relation to scandalising the court, the Commission is inclined to get rid of
this version of contempt as a relic of a previous age. However, it does ask
whether some sort of statutory offence should replace it, though hints that it
feels there are plenty of ways individual judges can seek recourse if attacked
in an extreme manner, for example, by using defamation and the proposed
Harmful Digital Communications legislation. I agree with this approach.
Contempt and jurors
As to contempt and jurors, the Commission discussed jurors using the internet
and looking for other evidence, and also the effects of pre-trial evidence. If
jurors have been instructed not to use the internet and are found to have done
so, this is a statutory contempt under s 365 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The
Commission surveyed NZ jury-warranted judges about their experience with
jurors. Twenty-nine per cent of those responding thought it had happened once
or twice though 58% thought not at all. The Commission thought this showed
the issue was not unduly problematic. It suggested some things could be done
to improve the situation, however, for example, there might be a more
interactive approach to empanelling where useful. Further, the idea of
explaining to potential jurors what the case is about and asking them to
withdraw if they have bias is floated. This has been used in high profile cases
in NZ already. The Commission questioned the effectiveness of ‘do not
research’ directions and suggested instead that written instructions for jurors
to keep may be more effective, including clear instructions on why they
should not research. Other suggestions made include instructions to be given
by all judges, not just as a discretion, and the inclusion of an instruction in the
oath. It should be made clearer to jurors they can ask questions during the trial,
and better presentation of evidence in court should be mandated, in particular,
better use of technology. However, sequestering was not supported.
The Commission favours an offence of undertaking research, with a
maximum 3 months imprisonment and a requirement for intention and
judge-alone trials where risk is significant. As to jurors disclosing
deliberations, the Commission proposes a statutory offence for anyone to
disclose or publish details of a jury’s deliberations or for anyone to solicit the
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information. There is a suggested defence for disclosure in the interests of
justice, though it is not clear whether this should be narrowly or broadly
drawn. A final report and recommendations are to be published in 2015.
Broadcasting Standards Authority
Introduction
In its 2014 Annual Report, the BSA notes it received 149 complaints,
compared to 138 in the previous year.81 It issued 99 decisions in the 2013/14
period and upheld only 12% of complaints. This compares to 16% in 2012/13.
Both are much lower rates generally than the near 27% upheld for the 2011/12
period.82 The Authority held its first ever oral hearing for a complex complaint
and the decision is awaited. The trend in the decisions made by this Authority
of upholding complaints but not imposing a penalty has continued, with half
of the decisions for the 2013/14 period being upheld with no order.
Private facts do not have to be true
In a recent decision, the Authority held that private facts do not actually have
to be facts.83 Therefore, as with the privacy tort, information covered by the
broadcasting regime can be private, whether it is true or not. Further, the
public arena is now taken to include publication on social media sites.84
Secret filming still risky
A Close Up item used secret film of a New Zealand doctor offering an
experimental stem cell treatment to people with Multiple Sclerosis.85 The
Authority agreed the doctor had been treated unfairly because he was not
given a fair opportunity to comment. Privacy was breached by use of the
hidden camera. The broadcaster could not show a public interest defence
outweighed privacy because it had not retained the raw footage from the
consultation. Legal costs of $5,500 were imposed as a penalty.
Reality programming and use of old footage
A man was filmed on his property over a fence eight years ago during
production of a reality television show about neighbour disputes. He
responded by giving one finger, which was captured on film and the footage
was used in the programme although he did not otherwise take part. Although
the man made it clear he wanted nothing to do with the programme, the
footage was used in an opening montage for the fourth series of the
programme in 2009, and that series was repeated in 2010 and 2013. The man
complained directly to the Authority.86 The Authority held that the camera
crew’s actions amounted to an intrusion in the nature of prying with the
81 Broadcasting Standards Authority, Annual Report 2014, p 16.
82 Broadcasting Standards Authority, Annual Report 2011, p 11.
83 Hill v Radio One BSA 2013-074.
84 Middleton v TVNZ BSA 2013-040.
85 Dr Z v Television New Zealand Ltd 2012-074.
86 TJ and Television New Zealand Ltd 2013-092.
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complainant’s interest in seclusion. Whether or not he knew of the filming and
of the planned broadcast, his body language and letters sent to the broadcaster
made it quite clear he did not want his image to be used. The filming and the
broadcast was a highly offensive intrusion because he made it clear he did not
consent repeatedly. An award of $1,000 compensation was made to the
complainant.
The risks associated with satirical news
Presenters of what is described by the Authority as a ‘new type of current
affairs and entertainment programme’ using comedy and entertainment
techniques, made comments about Colin Craig, the leader of the Conservative
Party, which attracted complaints on the grounds of good taste and decency,
accuracy, law and order, controversial issues, fairness, discrimination and
denigration, responsible programming and violence (almost all possible
grounds of complaint excepting children’s interests and liquor!).87 Two
broadcasts were involved, one was a skit that lampooned Mr Craig’s views on
same-sex marriage, and the other focused on him personally. The Authority
noted that there is a higher threshold for breach of fairness where public
figures are involved. The first broadcast was found to be possibly offensive to
some but not unfair. The second broadcast, however, contained some
comments which were sustained personal abuse masquerading as satire, such
as ‘I think Colin Craig is a nutcase; I feel Colin Craig is a doofus; I believe
Colin Craig is a smarmy rich prick’, which had no bearing on Mr Craig’s
political views. These comments were found to be unfair. No other grounds
for the complaint were upheld.
Press Council
Introduction
From mid-2013 the Press Council has had a new chair, Sir John Hansen, a
retired High Court judge. The Council received 142 complaints in 2013
compared to 157 for the previous year. It issued decisions on 61 complaints in
the 2013 year, five less than the 76 decisions in the 2012 year.88 The uphold
rate for 2012 was 28%, which is high for the Press Council but similar to the
year before. However, in 2013, the uphold rate dropped rather dramatically
back to 18%. The Council has stated in the past that it wished to mediate more
complaints. However, in 2012 it mediated or resolved 6% of complaints and
in 2013, even less, at 4%. In March 2014, the Press Council announced it was
opening membership to bloggers and taking on more extensive powers.89 A
new form of membership has been available since May 2014 to
non-newspaper digital media, conditional on agreement to the same
conditions as apply to current members. A new fee structure is based on the
size of the digital entity and its commercial or non-commercial status.
87 Craig v Television New Zealand Ltd 2013-034.
88 Forty-first Report of the New Zealand Press Council, 7.
89 New Zealand Press Council, NZ Press Council to extend coverage, gain new powers,
27 March 2014, at <http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/articles/Press_Council_-
_Press%20statement_230314.pdf> (accessed 11 December 2014).
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Member websites must have a clear complaints process and advice about the
possibility of complaint to the Council. The Council also has powers to
censure and order take-down of material. These changes have been made in
part to respond to the Law Commission report on new media and to the
government response to that report rejecting the recommendations but stating
an expectation that existing forms of media self-regulation would continue to
adapt to digital media.90
Inaccuracy, discrimination
An ill-judged inflammatory news story was published in the Press newspaper
in 2013 about the increase in chlamydia in the Canterbury region since 2011.
The headline of the article was ‘Luck of the Irish has downside in sex-disease
stats.’ The introduction read ‘Irish workers helping with the rebuild [after the
Canterbury earthquakes] are sharing the love but it seems they may also be
helping to spread sexual disease.’ The article was illustrated by a cartoon
showing two men in green coats approaching a doorway with a sign for the
STD Clinic from which came a song ‘If yer Irish come into the parlour.’ The
Council found the article to be inaccurate as the statistics did not support the
message about the Irish, and discriminatory, as was the cartoon.91 Although
cartoons have some leeway in terms of being opinion with more licence to
offend, in this case the cartoon illustrated a serious (and inaccurate) news item
and was therefore treated according to the same standards as the news article.
The Council also noted its disapproval of the behaviour of the journalist in
responding in a flippant and rude manner to complaints about the article on
Twitter.
Hyperbole, headlines and women’s magazines
Headlines, sub-headings and captions should accurately and fairly convey the
substance or a key element of the report they are designed to cover.92 In a 2006
decision, Trina Stevens v Women’s Day,93 the Council upheld a complaint that
a headline on the cover of an edition of Women’s Day was misleading. The
two large headlines stated: ‘POSH pregnant AGAIN!’ and ‘JEN’S
PREGNANT!’ over photographs of Victoria Beckham and Jennifer Aniston. A
circle enclosing the words ‘SHOCK BABY NEWS’ accompanied the material
relating to the latter. The articles about each celebrity inside the magazine
made it clear the statements were speculation, not fact. The Council upheld the
complaint by a majority of seven, which, while recognising freedom of
expression and accepting that some latitude might be given to escapist stories
about celebrity figures and some licence for inventiveness to headline and
caption writers, thought it would be going too far to allow the making up of
claims in headlines which were not substantiated by the copy inside the
publication. However, the minority of four thought the principle of accuracy
simply had no application to this sector of the media and that the market
90 See The News Media Meets ‘New Media’, LC R128, (2013).
91 Case Numbers 2354-2357, Smyth et al v the Press.
92 New Zealand Press Council, Statement of Principles, Principle 6, at
<http://www.presscouncil.org.nz/principles_2.php> (accessed 12 December 2014).
93 Case No 1060, Trina Stevens v Woman’s Day (2006).
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would provide a solution because unhappy readers could simply cease buying
the magazine. This view now appears to predominate in the Council, which
has rejected a recent similar complaint.94 A headline which said ‘R-Patz &
Katy’s Wedding Shock’ on the cover of Woman’s Day magazine of June 2013
was complained about as misleading. The article dealt with relationship issues
of celebrity couple Katy Perry and Robert Pattison and contained nothing to
substantiate the teaser in the headline. The majority of the Council took the
position of the minority in the 2006 decision, that the article was clearly
gossip, which by its very nature, can be ambiguous or mislead. Furthermore,
the majority thought that if the article was misleading its readers, they were
accepting of the possibility, since the nature of such magazines is well known.
In other words, no one takes such magazines too seriously, so the ordinary
stringencies do not apply. Thus women’s magazines appear to have dropped
out of the jurisdiction of the Press Council whether they belong or not.
Gratuitous reference to ethnicity
The Council has upheld a complaint that an article discussing a rape trial and
conviction gratuitously referred to the guilty defendants as ‘Fijian Indians’.95
The article gave no context to the ethnic label and as such, placed unnecessary
emphasis on the matter of race. It breached Principle 6 which recognises that
race may be the subject of legitimate discussion when relevant and in the
public interest.
Online Media Standards Authority (OMSA)
New Zealand’s new online regulator has extended its membership to include
new media. Any media proprietor who publishes news and current affairs
content online can apply to be a member of OMSA.96 The media proprietor
must be an individual or organisation which carries on activities aimed at a
public audience online.97 The current members of OMSA are: Television New
Zealand Limited, MediaWorks TV Limited, MediaWorks Radio Limited,
Maori Television Services, Sky Network Television Limited, The Radio
Network Limited, Radio New Zealand Limited, and two bloggers, David
Farrar (kiwiblog) and the controversial Whale Oil Beef Hooked, otherwise
known as Cameron Slater.98
Settled complaints
Most complaints made to OMSA have been declined at the threshold entry
level by the chair. However, of note is Mitchell v Television New Zealand,99
which is an example of how OMSA sees itself as being involved in ‘settling’
94 Case No 2339, Heatherbell-Brown v Woman’s Day (2013).
95 Case No 2332, Joris de Bres v Waikato Times (2013).
96 Online Media Standards Authority, Fifth Schedule, <www.omsa.co.nz/constitution/current-
membership> (accessed 1 November 2014).
97 Online Media Standards Authority, OMSA membership application form, at
<http://www.omsa.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/OMSA-Membership-Application-Form-
2014.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2014).
98 http://www.omsa.co.nz/constitution/current-membership/ accessed 12 December 2014.
99 [2014] NZOMSA 2 (7 February 2014).
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a complaint. Here the chairman noted OMSA had referred the complaint to
TVNZ for a response to a complaint where an inaccurate photo accompanied
a story ‘Malaysia church attacked by firebombs’. TVNZ acknowledged there
was a possible breach of Standard 1 Accuracy and removed the photo and
included a note on the story advising the photo had been removed and why.
These self-regulatory actions meant there was no further benefit in placing the
matter before the Complaints Committee as the material of concern had been
removed. The chairman found there was no actual inaccuracy in the article
involved. Therefore the chairman determined the complaint was settled.
First full decision of Complaints Committee - accuracy
One of the few decisions to reach the Complaints Committee, Munro v Radio
New Zealand,100 concerned Standard 1 Accuracy. The complainant argued that
the opening sentence of an article titled ‘Labour Confident of strong Party list’
based on a broadcast interview which stated that ‘The Labour leader, David
Cunliffe says his party hopes to get at least 34 per cent of party vote and six
new MPs into Parliament in the election,’ was inaccurate as it put words into
the mouth of the interviewee that were never said and denied on the spot.
Radio New Zealand considered this was reasonable paraphrasing and the
sentence did not compromise audience understanding that David Cunliffe
referred to obtaining a possibly higher proportion than 34% of the party vote.
The minority of the Committee was of the view that the sentence was not an
accurate representation as required by Standard 1 and guideline 1(b).
However, the majority ruled the sentence did accurately reflect and paraphrase
David Cunliffe’s statement and did not meet the threshold to breach the code.




In the last update, I noted that New Zealand has a new Search and
Surveillance Act,101 based on recommendations made by the
Law Commission in 2007.102 The regime is under challenge already by
journalist Nicky Hager, whose best-seller book, Dirty Politics, was published
in 2014 just prior to an election. The book was based on numerous emails and
other social media exchanges between blogger Cameron Slater and others,
which Hager received unsolicited from an unknown hacker. Following a
complaint by Slater about the stolen information,103 police executed a warrant
search of Hager’s home which took place over 10 hours while he was away,
although he had been advised of the search and had stated there was nothing
on the premises relevant to the warrant. Nonetheless, a great deal of
information in various forms was removed by police. Hager immediately
100 [2014] NZOMSA 6 (2 July 2014).
101 2012, No 24.
102 NZLC R97, Search and Surveillance Powers, 2007.
103 Slater’s application for an interim privacy injunction is discussed under Privacy, above.
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claimed source confidentiality in the information and this issue will eventually
be tested in court under the search and surveillance legislation, which provides
a process whereby all the seized material is preserved and delivered to a court
until the matter can be determined.104 Hager and his legal team are also
seeking judicial review of the search, claiming the warrant was unlawful.
104 Search and Surveillance 2012, ss 136, 146, 147.
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